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Abstract 
There is a persistent aversion towards methodological discourse by most 
mainstream economists. Frank Hahn (1992) exemplified this attitude  and 
provoked a number of  reactions concerning the role and the reasons for  
methodological aversion. After offering a categorization of the main 
explanations for methodological aversion, the paper suggests an explanation 
that is based on the role of the physics scientific ideal. It  argues that the strive 
to achieve the high scientific status of physics  by following the methods of 
physics, contributed to the negative mainstream attitude towards economic 
methodology. This can be reinforced by examining the writings of extremely 
influential mainstream economists such as Irwin Fisher and Milton Friedman. 
These works clearly imply that the hard science status of economics renders 
methodological discussions and especially  methodological criticism, rather 
pointless. Given that the existing prescriptions for making economic 
methodology more attractive do not give much thought to this important 
aspect of mainstream economics, the paper also argues for a more 
systematic discussion of this issue. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 Methodological   discussions  concerning the discipline of economics 
were never very popular among many mainstream theorists. On the contrary, 
one can discern a certain aversion (often hostility) towards methodological 
matters. This aversion to economic methodology was exemplified by the  well-
know Frank Hahn’s (1992a,b) arguments  against the pursuit of 
methodological discourse. This negative attitude towards economic 
methodology  is still the case, given that nowadays papers on economic 
method are rarely published in established high ranking mainstream journals.  
The prevailing view (still mostly based on Hahn’s  line of thinking) is that 
questions concerning the method of economics are not worthy. The core of  
Hahn’s views was that  these questions do not make much difference as how 
economic research is pursued. Moreover, the selection process of  economic 
foundations ensures the prevalence of sound methodological foundations, 
and that in any case, economists are amateurs to deal with these issues 
(Hahn, 1992a; see also  Hargreaves Heap, 2000). 
 Hahn’s position provoked a number of responses mainly by specialists 
in economic methodology. The most prominent of these responses included 
Backhouse (1992), Lawson (1992, 1994), Caldwell (1993), and  Hoover 
(1995). These authors elaborated various lines of arguments in their attempt 
to refute Hahn’s anti-methodology stance. This discussion  had also a very 
important repercussion: it opened the ground for the investigation for the main 
reasons for the observed  methodological aversion of mainstream economics. 
Although the literature on this issue remains rather undeveloped, Lawson 
summarized the following reasons: ideological concerns, psychological 
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motives, merely defensive responses through fear, or dislike, of criticism, the 
lack of any philosophical training, and sheer ignorance (Lawson, 1994, p.107). 
Furthermore, other reasons that have been suggested  have to do with the 
internal structure of mainstream economics as well as reasons related to the 
philosophy of the discipline (e.g. Caldwell, 1990; Frey, 2001). 
However,  another possible reason which has not received attention in 
the relevant literature can be attributed to the continuous dominance of the 
physics scientific ideal in economics.  In particular, the orthodox perception is 
that the scientific prestige of physics-based methodology with a high degree 
of formalism, makes methodological discussion and critique obsolete. This 
tendency can be observed in the development of the influence of physics in 
economics and the resulting growing mathematization of the discipline 
especially after WWII. The relevant writings of Irwin Fisher and Milton 
Friedman provide the prime examples of this trend. Fisher (1892; 1932) was 
the first major theorist to dismiss methodological discussion by appealing to 
physics methods. Furthermore, Friedman’s (1953) essay provided a 
methodological outline which effectively dismisses any discourse concerning 
the role of assumptions in economics. To a large extent, Friedman employed 
examples from physics in  order to support his methodological arguments.   
 The paper will start with a discussion of issue of mainstream 
methodological aversion. It will proceed to a presentation of the main 
explanations that have been offered in the literature. Consequently, it will 
examine the connection between the physics methodological ideal and 
methodological aversion focusing on the writings of  Fisher and Friedman. 
With the above in mind, it will also argue that the physics ideal is also relevant 
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in explaining the general hostility towards the study of economic methodology. 
The implications of this argument for  methodological discourse will also be 
considered.  
  
II. Methodological Aversion  
Methodological discussion concerning the nature of economics as a 
field of study  is not new. As Hausman writes “There have  been reflections  
on economic methodology for as long as there have been reflections on 
economics itself” (Hausman, 2001, p.65).  The examples of specialist works 
by such figures as J.S. Mill, J.N. Keynes and L. Robbins are indicative (for a 
history of major methodological contributions, see Blaug, 1980; Hands, 
2001a). However, the field of economic methodology as a separate discipline 
was established in the early 1980’s. In the words of Laurence Boland: “Since 
1982 there has been the establishment of a small, non-mainstream group of 
would-be methodologists…” (Boland 1982, p. 4). Nowadays, economic 
methodology has the characteristics  of a distinguishable subfield (see also 
Hands, 2001b; Davis, 2007; Düppe, 2011). 
A number of authors have identified  the established methodological 
aversion among mainstream economists. Even since 1980’s  the period 
where there was the emergence of economic methodology as a separated 
discipline,  most mainstream economists still paid no heed to this rising trend 
(Boland 1982, p. 4). A decade later,  Bruce Caldwell reaches the same 
conclusion:  “Lest there be any doubt, it should be stated at the outset that, at 
least in the US., most economists are indifferent towards methodology, and 
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many of the rest are openly hostile to it” (Caldwell, 1990, p.64). A similar 
observation is made by Tony Lawson a few  years later when he writes: 
“It is not, I think, contentious to observe that explicit methodological analysis 
and commentary are widely frowned upon in contemporary economics, 
especially by those working in the mainstream.” (Lawson, 1994, p.106). 
 
This tendency  was explicitly expressed and was given  theoretical 
backing by Frank Hahn in his famous -among economic methodologists-  
article published in the Royal Economic Society Newsletter in 1992. Hahn’s  
advice to young economists was to urge them to  'avoid discussion of 
"mathematics in economics" like the plague', and  to 'give no thought at all to 
methodology'.  This position was reinforced  when  in the July 1992 issue of 
the same publication, Roger Backhouse put the question: 'Should we ignore 
methodology?',  the heading of a response by Hahn is 'Answer to Backhouse: 
Yes'. (see Hahn, 1992a, 1992b; Backhouse, 1992). The basic components of 
Hahn’s argument were the following: 1. Economists are not philosophers of 
science and therefore these issues are best left to specialists. 2. 
Methodological  discussions do not have considerable impact  on how 
economics is practised. Even when they make much difference, the results 
are by no means unambiguously good (e.g. positivist proselytizing). 3. 
Economics foundations look after themselves as there is a process of 
selection whereby economics with good foundations prospers while 
economics with bad foundations withers (Hahn, 1992a; see also Hargreaves 
Heap, 2000, p.96). 
 A number of papers  sprang out of this exchange attempting to justify 
the usefulness of economic methodology with main examples being 
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Backhouse,  1992; 2010; Lawson, 1992, 1994; Hoover, 1995; Hargreaves 
Heap, 2000. Most of these papers provided arguments and specific examples 
in order to counter Hahn’s anti-methodology stance. However, the attitude of 
mainstream economics towards economic methodology does not appear to 
have changed significantly (see also Davis, 2003). 
 Although Hahn’s piece expressed and justified the implicit 
contemporary mainstream  view on this issue, there have also been anti-
methodology approaches originating from non-mainstream authors such as D. 
McCloskey (1986) and R. Weintraub (1989). However, the foundations of 
these objections are totally different, since they are mainly derived from a 
post-modernistic philosophy of science.  The core of these approaches is  that 
the possibility  of scientific objectivity is extremely problematic and that 
scientific theories are merely narratives, thus clearly leading to relativism. 
According to  Lawson, the implication of this stance is: “because science 
seemingly loses possibility of critical engagement with any extra-linguistic 
reality there can be no scope in science for methodology  broadly conceived.” 
(Lawson, 1994, p.126). Therefore, the endeavor of economic methodology 
falls into this category and it is more or less meaningless. It has to be noted 
though, that this strand of methodological aversion has not had  significant 
impact on the  orthodox attitude towards economic methodology. 
 
III. Main Explanations 
The underlying reasons for the observed methodological aversion of 
mainstream economics have not received adequate attention, although there 
are a few papers which attempt to provide some possible explanations. One 
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may distinguish two broad approaches towards this important issue. The first 
category of explanation has to do with the internal and institutional structure of 
the field. In this sense, it draws from  the sociological aspects of  economics 
viewpoint (see for example, Coats, 1993; Hands, 1994). The second category 
refers to the methodological framework of mainstream economics and 
therefore, to the philosophy of science. Similarly, one can employ the tools of 
the  Internal and External  History of Science approach in order to distinguish 
the two  general lines of explanation relating to the above discussion. Internal 
history of science focuses on the ways in which evidence and argument lead 
to scientific change. External history of science concerns how social, 
technological, psychological, and even natural causal factors have influenced 
the course of science (Hausman, 2001, p.66). 
Even before the Hahn debate, Bruce Caldwell supplied an early 
explanation by  identifying five possible reasons for methodological aversion 
(Caldwell, 1990). In sum, these reasons were: 1. A knowledge of methodology 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for becoming a good 
economist. This is linked to the time constraint for mastering the standard 
tools of economic theory rather than to engage in philosophical discussions. 
2. Most philosophical discussions about the way to do science are irrelevant 
for economics. As Caldwell points out, this argument reduces to the simple 
question of the relevance of studying philosophy (Caldwell, 1990, p.65). 3. 
Methodological debates are often sterile never reaching any conclusions. This 
argument is connected to the previous one. 4. Economic Methodology only 
interests a small fringe of the profession, often heterodox schools of 
economics. The standard perception is that “real” economists do not do 
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methodology. 5. Methodology is superfluous for economics. (“we know what 
economics is”). In view of the above categorization, reasons  1, 4 and 5 
obviously relate to the sociology of economics. Reasons 2 and  3  concern the 
nature of economics as a science.  
After attempting to counter these objections,  Caldwell argues that the 
more important reason has to do  with the influence of positivism on 
mainstream economics. Thus, he is implicitly placing more weight to the 
second category  of explanation. In particular, he maintains  that positivism 
has been rejected by philosophers, and the new philosophies of science make 
economic methodology much more appealing. His earlier work which 
concentrates on the redundancy of positivism in economics, should be viewed 
in tandem  with the above argumentation (Caldwell, 1982). 
A couple of years after the publication of Hahn’s essay, Tony Lawson 
provided  an explanation based on the existing philosophical foundations of 
economic orthodoxy, thus attributing methodological aversion to the 
philosophy of economics. In particular, his central thesis is  that the prevailing 
influence of positivism is the main factor for this hostility towards 
methodological discussion. In Lawson’s  words: 
“It has been argued that the belief, seemingly widely held within economics, 
that philosophical/methodological reasoning has been and must be unhelpful 
to the discipline arises from a misplaced trust in results rooted in (or derived 
via a sideways displacement of) the philosophical perspective of (a version of) 
positivism… Positivism in all its forms, however, is untenable and the resulting 
dismissal of methodology is unsustainable”. (Lawson, 1994, p.128).  
 
Lawson  focuses his criticism on the version of positivism popular in 
mainstream economics and proceeds to argue that the  abandonment of 
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positivism will make methodological reasoning in economics highly desirable 
(Lawson, 1994).  It is clear that Lawson’s argumentation concerning the role 
of positivism has a lot in common with the views expressed by Caldwell.  
Another  more recent attempt to provide an explanation for the 
methodological aversion was proposed  by Bruno Frey in 2001. Frey’s line of 
thinking is exclusively focused on the sociology of economics. He maintains 
that the publication process of economics journals is the main cause and 
more specifically, the formalism bias of  top mainstream journals. As he points 
out, “There is considerable bias in the direction of formalistic papers making 
minor addition to accepted knowledge.” (Frey, 2001, p.43). This is reinforced 
by the intense competition for publication linked to successful  academic 
careers. In Frey’s  view, there is a large gap between economic methodology 
and economic practice,  and this will remain as long as external incentives 
remain the same (Frey, 2001).  
In his response to Hahn, Backhouse maintains that because  
methodology is unavoidable in economics, the study of economic 
methodology should be taken more seriously (Backhouse, 1992). His call for a 
more professional attitude to methodology implies that amateurism to 
methodological matters might be an explanation for the mainstream  
methodological aversion. In this sense, it  can be seen as belonging to the line 
of thinking emphasizing  the sociological aspects of economics.  In the same 
framework, Hoover in his review of four books on economic methodology, 
seems to adopt  the  similar position  that economic methodologists are 
viewed as amateurs. As he writes:  
 
 10 
“The argument about the irrelevance of methodology has shifted and become 
socialised in that it no longer claims that the issues raised by methodologists 
are irrelevant, but rather that some people do not have the social standing to 
raise them.” (Hoover, 1995, p.718). 
 
In sum, the above two broadly defined approaches have offered important 
insights into the persisting tendency of mainstream economics to ignore 
economic methodology.  
 
IV. Physics  and Methodological Aversion 
Apart from the above explanations for the methodological aversion, the 
influence of the physics scientific ideal on mainstream economics is the one 
which has received little attention. The natural science  ideal was present 
even in the writings of many classical economists. Examples of the analogy 
between economics and physical sciences can be found in Smith 
(astronomy), Cairnes (chemistry), Say (chemistry and physics) and  Mill 
(geometry) (Smith, 1980ed, Cairnes, 1875; Say, 1803; Mill, 1874).  However, 
the tendency to  imitate the methods of physics became much more apparent 
with the emergence of the marginalist school. Jevons’ assertion that the 
theory of economy presents a close analogy to the science of statical 
mechanics (Jevons, 1871, p.viii), and Walras’ prediction that mathematical 
economics will rank with the mathematical sciences of astronomy and 
mechanics (Walras, 1965, p.47, 48), are indicative examples in this respect 
(see also Mirowski, 1984, 1989; 1991; Turk, 2012). The work of second 
generation marginalist F. Y. Edgeworth, represents the highest point of 
physics and in particular, of classical physics methodological influence. In his 
main work Mathematical Psychics (1881), Edgeworth not only carried the 
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analogy to its extreme, but also provided a thorough methodological 
justification. Similarly, the work of I. Fisher, the popularizer of marginalism and 
neoclassical economics in the US, also exhibits the same tendency.  Fisher 
took  terms and concepts from classical physics (especially hydraulics) and 
transferred  them directly to economics, also providing the appropriate 
methodological basis for their use. Thus, the writings of those two influential 
economists were paramount for the general acceptance of “economics being 
parallel to physics” methodological paradigm (see also Drakopoulos, 
forthcoming).  
The physics scientific ideal  is also relevant in explaining the general 
hostility towards the study of economic methodology. It can be maintained 
that  the gradual establishment of the physics methodological ideal justified to 
a large extent,  the increased formalization of mainstream economics 
(Mirowski, 1991; Morgan, 2012). In turn, the increased formalization combined 
with the scientific prestige of physics methods  makes methodological 
discussion and critique obsolete. Moreover, it shields economics from 
methodological attacks. One  can discern the above argument  in the 
following quotation which provides the core of Fisher’s  methodological 
viewpoint. 
“The introduction of  mathematical method marks a stage  of growth –
perhaps it is not too extravagant to say, the entrance of political 
economy on a scientific era.” (Fisher, 1892, p.85). 
 
Fisher was convinced that terms from physics correspond to terms in 
economics, thus supporting explicitly the close analogy between economics 
and classical mechanics. He presents a list of terms that economists use and 
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which have been employed from physics. Examples are: equilibrium, stability, 
elasticity, expansion, inflation , reaction, distribution (price), levels, movement, 
and friction. In addition, he  constructs a table of correspondence of terms and 
concepts between classical mechanics and economics (Fisher, 1892, p.24, 
and pp.85-86). Given the establishment of a close analogy between the two 
disciplines, it follows that methodological questions concerning economics are 
not necessary since economics has become an advanced science in the 
manner of physics.  The futility of economic methodology is then clearly 
expressed in the following statement:  
 
“It has long seemed to me that students of the social sciences, 
especially sociology and economics, have spent too much time in 
discussing what they call methodology. I have usually felt that the man 
who essays to tell the rest of us how to solve knotty problems would be 
more convincing if first he proved out his alleged method by solving a 
few himself. Apparently those would-be authorities who are forever 
telling others how to get results do not get any important results 
themselves.” (Fisher, 1932, p. 1). 
 
Fisher’s viewpoint concerning the nature of economics and its 
relationship with physics is also present in a discussion among prominent 
American  economic theorists of  the period. Fisher presented his  views 
regarding the nature of the discipline with such figures as  H. J. Davenport, W. 
H. Hamilton, Richard T. Ely, and B. M. Anderson, Jr. This discussion which 
was published in the American Economic Review, the physics ideal is present 
and clear. As he writes: 
“One of the speakers has said that economics is not physics. No, but its 
method is the method of physics, and I believe a study of physics to be 
one of the best preparations for a young man intending to enter 
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economic theory. The trouble with economic theory is that economists 
have entered the field, either from the a priori side of philosophy and 
metaphysics where the proper importance of cold facts has not been 
recognized, or on the other hand, from the side of history where only 
facts and not principles have been studied.” (Davenport et al, 1916, 
p.167). 
 
  
Fisher’s work  established a close connection between physics and economic 
concepts but more importantly, it provided an extensive methodological 
justification for the physics analogy in economics (see also Drakopoulos, 
1994). Given that the high scientific status of economics had been achieved, 
methodological discourse was deemed  to be irrelevant and unnecessary. In 
this respect, Fisher’s  approach has had a major influence to the 
establishment of current orthodox  methodological aversion. 
The increased formalization of economics continued  with the seminal 
works of John Hicks, Paul Samuelson and John von Neumann. The aim was 
to construct a mathematical economic theory so as to make it as ‘scientific’ as 
the hard sciences. Hicks’ adherence to methodological monism exemplified 
by his statement that “the method of modern economic investigation is the 
same method of all science” is a clear indication of the target of scientific 
economics (Hicks, 1939, p.3). The publication of Samuelson’s Foundations 
was also full of mathematical methods used in  physics as Samuelson himself 
admits in an essay dealing with the intellectual development of his seminal 
work: 
“I was vaccinated early on to understand that economics and physics 
could share the same formal theorems (Euler’s theorem on 
homogeneous functions, Weierstrass’s theorems on constrained 
maxima, Jacobi determinant identities underlying Le Chatelier reactions, 
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etc.), while still not resting on the same empirical foundations and 
certainties.” (Samuelson 1998, p. 1376). 
  
It is also noteworthy  that Samuelson’s early views regarding economic 
method which were outlined in his Foundations, were explicitly  drawing from 
the scientific philosophy of operationalism as expressed by  physicist Percy 
Bridgman (Samuelson, 1948; see also, Blaug, 1980, p.99). Finally, his 
subsequent aphorism to methodological discourse is ultimately based on the 
hard science argument. As he writes: “Those who can, do science; those who 
can’t prattle about its methodology.”  (Samuelson, 1992, p.240). 
In the same conceptual framework, John von Neumann, who was very 
influential for the further development of formalism in economics, also 
advocated and strongly promoted the use of the methods of physics to 
economic problems (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, pp.3-7; see also 
Rashid, 1994). It is indicative that von Neumann held that even the most 
advanced theoretical works in economic theory at the time, were seriously 
lacking in mathematical rigor  in comparison to physics.1 As he writes in a  
letter to O. Morgenstern: “Economics is simply still a million miles away from 
the state in which an advanced science is, such as physics” (Morgenstern 
1976: p. 810). However, von Neumann clearly believes that the achievement 
of the scientific status of physics is attainable and only a matter of time. The 
following passage is the epitome  of the physics ideal in economics: 
“Our knowledge of the relevant facts of economics is incomparably smaller 
than that commanded in physics at the time when the mathematization of that 
subject was achieved… It would have been absurd in physics to expect 
                                                 
1
 For a detailed discussion of the views of  von Neumann and Morgenstern concerning the 
epistemological model of physics, see Mirowski, 1992.   
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Kepler and Newton without Tycho - and there is no reason to hope for an 
easier development in economics.” (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944: 4) 
 
Thus, by the middle of the previous century, mainstream economics had 
reached a high degree of formalism by mainly employing mathematical tools 
from physics (see also Debreu, 1991)2. During the same period, the 
publication  of the  well-know essay by Milton Friedman (1953) was the  next 
major factor after Fisher that influenced the observed mainstream 
methodological aversion. Obviously, Friedman’s work was not anti-
methodology per se, but its arguments essentially reinforced the negative 
mainstream attitude towards economic methodology. Friedman’s work was 
extremely influential among mainstream economics. As Hausman states ‘It is 
the only essay on methodology that a large number, perhaps a majority, of 
economists have ever read’ (Hausman 1992: 162).  In particular, most 
mainstream economists are content with the methodological outline provided 
by Friedman’s (1953) essay which effectively dismisses any methodological 
discourse concerning the role of assumptions in economics.  As Düppe points 
out:  
“On the contrary, his [Friedman] slogan of Who-Cares-About-Assumptions 
expressed nothing but the futility of philosophical arguments about economic 
knowledge. And only in this respect could the article be successful. It excused 
the economists’ ignorance about methodology and provoked the philosopher 
of science.” (Düppe, 2011, p.169).   
 
                                                 
2
 The  high degree of mathematization of contemporary mainstream economics has been the 
subject of  much debate which focuses on the nature and method of the discipline (see for 
instance, Beed and Kane, 1991; Lawson, 2003; Dow, 2012) 
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It is suggestive that in  this essay, Friedman also uses the analogy of physical 
sciences in his effort to construct the methodological basis of positive 
economics:  
“In short, positive economics is, or can be, an ‘objective’ science, in 
precisely the same sense as any of the physical sciences.” (Friedman, 
1953, p.2)  
 
Friedman uses examples from physics in order to provide justification for his 
approach. The case of the simplifying  assumptions of a falling body is 
mentioned as an example where a theory cannot be tested by its 
assumptions. Furthermore, the case of the billiard player who makes his shots 
as if he knew the complicated mathematical formulas, is used in order to 
provide support for the as if theorizing in economics (Friedman, 1953, pp.11-
13). Although, Friedman’s essay has been the subject of extensive criticism 
(see for instance, Mäki 2003; 2009), it still shapes  current mainstream 
perception linked to  the high scientific status of economics (deriving from its 
close analogies to physics) and thus, to the futility of  any methodological 
discussion.  
At this point. the views about the decline of popularity of  the history of 
economic thought as a sub-discipline (which is a close neighboring field to 
economic methodology), are relevant. Although the reasons offered for its 
decline are more oriented towards the internal dynamics and the institutional 
structure of economics, there is also the idea of hard science status (see also 
Caldwell, 2013). In particular, Mark Blaug has identified this factor in his 
discussion of the falling appeal and status of the history of economic thought 
as a subject. As the following quotation indicates: “The hard sciences do not 
 17 
much bother with their own histories—a statement less true than it used to 
be—and if economics is a real science, neither should economists”.(Blaug, 
2001, p.146). Unfortunately, Blaug did not elaborate further this line of 
explanation.  
 Finally, a large part of the literature that aimed to respond to Hahn’s 
anti-methodology views, have also attempted to suggest possible ways of 
making economic methodology more attractive and more ‘relevant’ to general 
economics practice. For instance, Hands calls for a redefinition of economic 
methodology  to encompass broader and more progressive  areas of inquiry 
such as science theory (Hands, 2001b, pp.57-58). Mäki argues that 
methodology  “is to be improved by making it less autonomous, by  welcoming 
influences from similar substantive research fields so as to enrich our image 
of real scientific agents in action”’ (Mäki, 2008, p. 421). Backhouse believes 
that that it needs to be done better in the future, something which is consistent 
with his amateurism-based explanation for  methodological aversion 
(Backhouse, 2010). Düppe emphasizes the key role of  history: “The 
programmatic implication of this insight is that no economic methodologist will 
ever communicate effectively as long as the need for methodological 
reflection is not historically established – historically because motivations lie in 
the past! Only then can economic methodology avoid feeding the ghosts that 
it hopes to cast out.” (Düppe, 2011, p.174). 
 Undoubtedly, the above prescriptions have their own merits. However, 
the continuing influence of the physics ideal needs also to be integrated in this  
debate. It follows that a more systematic  discussion concerning the nature of 
the relationship of economics to natural sciences in general, might be  a 
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positive contribution of economic methodology to economics and to the 
subfield itself. 
  
V. Concluding Comments 
It is clear that there is an  observed aversion or even hostility of 
mainstream economics towards economic methodology which was reinforced 
by Hahn’s piece in 1992. Economic methodologists have attempted to provide 
possible reasons for this phenomenon. We argued that these explanations 
can be categorized into two broad lines of thinking. The first had to do with the 
sociological aspects of economics or similarly, with the external  histories of 
science. The second approach focuses on the way that a discipline 
incorporates evidence and argument or similarly, on its internal history. This 
paper maintained that the scientific ideal of physics has also played a crucial 
role to the observed methodological aversion. In particular, the strive to 
achieve the high scientific status of physics  was a significant influence on the 
formation of mainstream economic thinking about the nature of economics. 
This was seen by studying the works of extremely influential mainstream 
economists such as Fisher and Friedman. Fisher, an enthusiastic supporter of 
the close parallel between physics and economics, was one of the first major 
figures to dismiss methodological speculation as a research activity. 
Friedman, with his irrelevance of the assumptions thesis, provided the rational 
for the futility of economic methodology. These developments facilitated the 
dominance of the now established view that the hard science status of 
economics renders methodological discussions and especially  
methodological criticism, pointless. The existing prescriptions for the making 
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economic methodology more attractive, do not give much thought to this 
important aspect of mainstream economics. 
 The physics imitation explanation  for the mainstream hostility to 
methodological discussion can be seen as belonging to the internal histories 
of science, because it refers to  the method of economics and therefore to its 
scientific philosophy.  The previous discussion indicated that the physics 
scientific ideal has contributed to methodological aversion since it ascribes the 
hard science status to mainstream economics. Thus, the mainstream attitude 
towards methodology  will continue as long as economics is perceived as a 
hard science like physics. There has been some work on the physics 
influence on economics mainly in the domain of the history of economic 
thought (the main example here is  Mirowski’s work). However, if economic 
methodology is to play a more central role, the topic of the scientific ideal of 
mainstream economics and its repercussions for the nature of the discipline, 
needs to receive much more attention by methodologists.  
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